Purpose -This study investigates the nature of the relationship between ownership concentration, owner identity and financial performance of publicly listed companies in New Zealand. This study also investigates whether the relationship between ownership-performance changes during the financial crisis period. Tobin's Q) and higher accounting-based performance (measured by ROA). We also report that the owner identity affect performance of publicly listed companies in New Zealand. More "detached" level owners (institutional investors) have positive effect on market-based performance but negative effect on accounting-based performance.
Introduction
Jenson and Meckling (1976), Ross (1973) and Eisenhardt (1989) using agency-theoretic viewpoint argue that different ownership structure and different roles people have in organisations are the main reasons for the existence of information asymmetry and the divergence of interest between owners (principals) and managers (agents). In this regard, prior researchers investigated: (i) the nature of agency problem existing between the principal and the agent and (ii) whether such problems can be mitigated by giving agents some proportion of ownership in the organisation they manage. Arguably, the research findings regarding the level of ownership should principals relinquish to the agents in order to motivate them to act on the principals' behalf remains inconclusive. One group of researchers have reported a positive linear relationship between some low levels of insider ownership and financial performance (Elayan et al., 2003; Mehran, 1995; Welch, 2003; Kim et al., 1988; Oswald and Jahera Jr., 1991; Hossain et al., 2001) , thus providing support to the convergence-of-interest hypothesis. Another group of researchers have reported the relationship between insider ownership and company financial performance is non-monotonic (Chen et al., , 1993; Griffith, 1999; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Short and Keasey, 1999) , that is, supporting convergence-of-interest hypothesis at some low levels of insider ownership and an entrenchment hypothesis at higher levels. These findings provide support to the view that the relationship between insider ownership and financial performance is non-linear. However, a third group of researchers (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) claim that insider ownership is endogenously determined and therefore, cannot be a determinant of company financial performance. For this reason, any observed correlation of ownership and financial performance is likely to be spurious. In fact, the relationship between insider ownership and financial performance might arise due to some company characteristics that are unobservable to the econometrician.
The conflicting findings reported regarding the insider ownership-financial performance nexus suggest that the debate over the precise functional form of the insider ownership is far from being over. It also suggests that nature of ownership structure may be country specific and therefore, findings may vary depending on the country's institutional and regulatory structures.
In addition, researchers have reported conflicting findings regarding the role of blockholders in mitigating agency problem. Some researchers have reported that blockholders have potential to influence monitoring mechanisms (Dodd and Warner, 1983 ) and while others (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004) argue that principal-principal agency problem exists between the block shareholders and the minority shareholders as well. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Gugler (1999) have reported evidence of blockholders receiving private benefits at an expense of the minority shareholders. According to Claessens et al. (2000) , blockholders receive private benefits through pyramidal business structures and cross-holdings across different companies.
Research findings reported regarding the insider and block ownership suggest that the degree of control (the percent of shares held by an investor) is an important determinant of the ownership-performance relationship (Cubbin and Leech, 1983) .
Arguably, researchers investigating ownership-performance relationship have assumed that shareholders' are homogenous. This assumption has been challenged by many, including Kang and Sorensen (1999) , who argue that shareholders are not always homogenous when they have different identities. In fact, some shareholders through their identity obtain powers that enable them to control companies in a manner that lead to extracting private benefits. The level of ownership and shareholder identity give shareholder's three bases for shareholder power, that is:
formal authority, social influence, and expertise (Kang and Sorensen, 1999) .
Shareholders' obtain formal authority by being a shareowner. However, shareholders' through their identity can also influence decision making processes by engaging in social activities (social influence) or having expertise knowledge (expertise). This indicate that the ownership-performance relationship may be different when shareholders have different identities, hold different proportion of ownership in companies, and have expertise that company needs (Short, 1994) . For example, Boone, Colombage and Gunasekarage (2011) reported that companies that have blockholders that are financial institutions have performed better compared to their peers. This finding suggests that not only degree of control (ownership concentration) but also location of control (identity of the shareholder) is an important determinant of the ownership-performance nexus.
Since prior research focused mainly on the ownership-performance relationship, the role shareholder identity (type of shareholder) play is less understood. This research is an attempt to fill the gap in the literature. Therefore, this research investigates the nature of the relationship between the proportion of ownership, shareholder identity and financial performance of publicly listed companies in New Zealand and whether the ownership-performance relationship changes during the financial crisis period. We address three noble questions in our study: (i) do the proportion of shares held by the shareholders' matter in terms of the financial performance of the publicly listed companies? (ii) Does the type of the identity of the shareholder matter in terms of financial performance? (iii) Does the relationship between ownership-performance changes during the financial crisis period?
Literature review
Agency-theoretic literature assumes that shareholders are homogenous and their influence on company financial performance is directly proportional to the percentage of equity they hold (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . In this regard, a number of researchers (Herman, 1981; Larner, 1971; Sorensen, 1996; McEachern, 1975 ) have compared the performance of the owner-controlled companies and manager-controlled companies and reported that owner-controlled companies perform better. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , manager-controlled companies have agency problems which can be mitigated by giving agents shares in the company.
Study undertaken by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) show that the insider holdings between 0 and 5 percent increases performance (interest-alignment hypothesis), between 5 and 24 percent decreases performance (entrenchment hypothesis), and insider ownership above 25 percent increases performance (interest-alignment hypothesis). Study undertaken in the US by Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2010) show that companies' Tobin's Q initially rose with an increase in the insider ownership but fell when the insider ownership exceeded 60 percent. However, Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) argue that mitigation of agency costs by giving insiders'
shares are possible only in countries where ownership dispersion exists. In countries where blockholding is a norm, studies show that principal-principal agency problem exists in addition to principal-agent agency problem (Rydqvist, 1987; Levy, 1982; Horner, 1988; Zingales, 1994) .
Prior studies investigating ownership-performance relationship have mainly focused on the conventional separation of ownership and control concept, that is, whether insider ownership and/or blockholding lead to financial performance. They assumed that all shareholders' have homogeneous goal. This assumption has been challenged by Kang and Sorensen (1999) -detached; and (iv) concentrated-involved. According to Mintzberg, the more involved and more concentrated owners will have greater influence on decision-making processes.
Different ownership concentration and owner identities give different levels power, that is: formal authority, social influence, expertise. Therefore, the level of power shareholders have determines in fact determines their nature of involvement.
Therefore, we argue that monitoring by different types of shareholders would lead to different outcomes.
By virtue of being a shareowner, gives them formal authority or legal right (Weber, 2008) . Formal authority or legal right gives shareholders the power to vote on ratification regarding appointment to the board of directors and the right to approve major business decisions (Clark, 1986) . If the proportion of shares held by the shareholders' are large, they can obtain some active role in the company as well. For example, large blockholders and institutional investors can appoint a representative on the board and/or a regular meeting with the board and the CEO, which provides them the opportunity to monitor managerial decisions.
According to Kang and Sorensen (1999) , the nature of social interactions between some shareholders and management also give shareholders' opportunity to influence the decision making processes. From the corporate governance point of view, the type of interpersonal relationships can significantly affect the resource allocation decisions in organisations (Pfeffer, 1992) . For example, through social interactions CEOs are able to appoint more outside directors or independent directors on the board which blockholders and institutional investors like and as a result, are more likely to negotiate golden parachute deal into their contract (Wade et al., 1990) . Zajac and Westphal (1995; 1996) argue that the demographic background of the directors may also provide a source of political power which may enable some shareholders to formulate relationships which may be beneficial for influencing decision making processes. Following this view, we argue that demographic background and reputation of the shareholders may provide different levels of social influence which may be beneficial when providing monitoring roles in companies.
Some large shareholders' have superior knowledge about the industry in which the company belongs to, which allows them to provide expertise to the management regarding critical environmental forces facing the company. This power is specific to the shareholder(s) and knowledgeable shareholders are the intangible assets of the companies. Since all types of shareholders want to maximise company value, shareholder expertise contributes positively towards this goal (Kang and Sorensen, 1999 ).
Based on above viewpoint, we argue that ownership concentration and identity have different levels of formal authority, social influence and expertise power which provide shareholders' with different levels of ability to motivate and monitor managerial behavior and influence decision making processes.
Ownership identity
Employee ( performance follow an inverted U-shape pattern in China. Rosen and Quarrey (1987) , studied employee participation in decision-making processes when employees have ownerships in companies and report that it enhances company performance. The findings provided above provide support to the view that ownership concentration level and identity play an important role in regarding how companies perform.
New Zealand Environment
Identity of the owner and the ownership structure of the publicly listed companies together with the governance mechanisms make this investigation interesting. New
Zealand has a small and open economy, a mature capital market and small number of companies listed compared to the larger economies of Australia, the USA and the UK. shareholders. Blockholders in publicly listed companies in New Zealand tends to be insiders as well as other different types (such as, institutions, corporates, etc.) which suggest that they may also play an important role in New Zealand context. employees are much higher in New Zealand compared to Australia, the UK and the US. The second highest corporate holding is in Australia (9.42%) and the second highest employee holding is in the UK (3.82%). The mean proportion of foreign holding in New Zealand is 6.67%, which is similar to Australia of 6.76% but lower than the UK (11.97%) but much higher than the US (0.83%). Government holding in these four countries is very low. In New Zealand, government holding is the highest at 2.46%, and in the US is the lowest at 0.1%. However, New Zealand and the UK have the lowest proportion of institutional holding which is 4.06% and 3.53%, respectively.
New Zealand Ownership Structure
Institutional holding in New Zealand and the UK are less than half of that in Australia (8.41%) and the US (9.04%). Data for the pension fund holding in New Zealand was not available; however, in other three countries it is very low. Results reported in Table 2 indicate that the "involvement" ownership type (corporate and employee) is much more popular in New Zealand than in other three countries.
<Insert Table 2 here> <Insert Chart 1 here> investing highly in these three sectors is that their motivation is highly connected to the companies' profits. Corporate holding is highest in the energy sector (43%).
Moreover, corporate holding is higher than 10% in all six sectors which indicate that corporate ownership type is the most popular and important type of ownership in New
Zealand.
<Insert Table 3 here> Table 4 reports the ownership per cent by owner identity and size of companies based on companies total assets. Total assets of the companies are divided in four segments:
LARGE, MEDIUM1, MEDIUM2, and SMALL. LARGE refers to companies that have total assets greater than and equal to $1 billion; MEDIUM1 refers to companies that have total assets greater than equal to $200 million and less than $1billion, MEDIUM2 refers to companies that have total assets greater than equal to $50million and less than $200million; and SMALL refers to companies that have total assets less than $50 million. Results reported in Table 4 <Insert Table 4 In addition, 80 company's data for 2010 was also used to obtain descriptive statistics which provide most recent statistical information regarding ownership structures of publicly listed companies in New Zealand.
Dependent variables
Following Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2008) , Kang and Stulz (1996), Morck, et al. (1988) , and Reddy et al. (2010) this study uses Tobin's Q as dependent variable. In addition, this study also uses return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE) as dependent variables. ROA has been used by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Finch and Shivadasani (2006).
Independent variables
The independent and control variables used in this study is similar to that used by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Xu and Wang (1992) .
We use two variables as proxy for Ownership concentration ( Similar to Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , we also take a logistic transformation of both TOP5 and H1 to convert an bounded variable into an unbounded one. Therefore, LT5
is determined as Ln(TOP5) and LH1 as Ln(H1)
We follow and also extend the method used by Xu and Wang's (1999 Total number of outstanding shares hold by each identity Total number of shares outstanding
To determine the effect of financial crisis on performance, two time dummy variables are created. BEFORE is equal to "1" if the year is before 2007, otherwise "0" and AFTER is equal to "1" if the year is after 2007, otherwise "0". To control for the size effect we use the natural log of total assets (SIZE) as the proxy for size. Leverage (LEV) of the company is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, and the firm level risk (FMRISK) is measured as the standard deviation of daily stock price.
A summary of dependent and control variables used in this study and their method of measurement is provided in Table 5 .
<Insert Table 5 here>
Model
This study examines the nature of the relationship between firm performance (PER) and ownership variables and tests whether the relationship is significant. Four dependent variables (Q, ROA) and two main type of independent variables (CON, OWN) are used to estimate the model using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
The regressions models used are as follows: The mean (median) of HI is 0.2 (0.13) and the mean (median) proportion of shares held by five largest shareholders (TOP5) is 0.56 (0.56), which is considered to be very high indicting more than half of the shares are controlled by five largest shareholders.
The maximum TOP5 is 98% and the minimum is 12%, indicating that companies in New Zealand are closely-held rather than widely-held.
The mean of IH is 0.03, FH and CH both have mean of 0.06, whereas mean of EH is the highest at 0.09. These results indicate that employee investors hold the largest proportion of shares in New Zealand market, and the institutions held the smallest.
The mean of LEV is 0.44 which is not considered to be very high, but the maximum The results reported in Table 6 show that 17.5% of companies belong to primary industry, 37.5% services, 12.5% investment, 7.5% energy, 17.5% goods, 5% property, and 2.5% are companies which are also listed in overseas stock exchanges.
<Insert Table 6 here> Table 7 report the pairwise correlation matrix for the independent variables. The correlation between LT5 and LH1 is the highest at 0.86, which is not surprising as the top five shareholders also have most concentrated shareholding as well. Apart from this result, the rest of correlation coefficient ranges between 0.35 (between LEV and SIZE and between FH and IH) and 0.002 (LT5 and FMRISK).
Correlation test
We also conducted the pairwise correlation between the dependent variables (Q, MB, ROA, ROE) and blockholder identity variables (HI, EH, FH, CH) and found the correlations coefficient were between 0.14 and 0.001. 3 These results further confirm that there are no multicollinearity issues in the data. In summary, results reported in Table 9 show that companies that have a higher level of ownership concentration will tend to have lower Tobin's Q and higher ROA but companies that are large will tend to have lower Tobin's Q but higher accounting based performance. Higher concentrated owner (blockholders) has more formal authority and they tend to hold enough shares to obtain active roles in the companies.
Based on the ownership concentration of the blockholders, their opinion tends to have a significant effect on the managers' activities. With blockholders in such an influential space, it is likely that the rights of the minority shareholders could be comprised.
<Insert Table 9 here> the SIZE, TIME and FMRISK are similar to that reported in Table 9 . In summary, results show that higher institutional holding increases performance measured by Tobin's Q and decreases accounting-based performance measured by ROA. The plausible reason could be that less "involvement" owners have less power and have less interest in controlling decision-making processes, therefore, pay less attention on day-today operations of the companies but focus more on the long-term growth. For example, institutional investors focus on the future returns or long run returns which is reflected by Tobin's Q. However, corporate holding has a negative effect on Tobin's Q.
OLS regression results for performance and ownership identity
<Insert Table 10 here>
OLS Regression Results for Performance and ownership identity during financial crisis
Tables 11, panels A and B report the OLS regression results for Equation 3 using Tobin's Q as dependent variable and ownership identity (OWN) in different time period as the independent variable, that is, before or after financial crisis. In Table 11 panel A, coefficients of two ownership identity variables IH and FH are positive and statistically significant at 5% levels, respectively. This result indicates that in post financial crisis period both institutional and foreign holding resulted in positive performance. However, the coefficient of CH is negative and is statistically significant at 5% level indicate that corporate holding has a negative effect on the financial performance measured by Tobin's Q.
In Table 11 panel B, coefficient of IH is positive and statistically significant at 5%
level, indicate that institutional holders invested in companies that could sustain short-term shocks such as those arising from the global financial crisis.
Results suggest that less "involvement" holdings had a positive performance measured by Tobin's Q. On the other hand, the results suggest that more "involvement" investors did not pay much attention to short-term performance and therefore, experienced more negative performance. The results reported in Table 11 show that during the financial crisis the effects of ownership identity on performance declined and all different types of shareholders reduced their shareholding proportion and therefore, lost some power of control.
<Insert Table 11 here>
Robustness Check
According to Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) , the empirical finance attempting to explain the causes and the effects of financial decisions often has serious issues with endogeneity. According to Roberts and Whited (2011) , endogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually impossible.
Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012), used GMM estimator to control for the dynamic nature of the performance-governance relationship suggested by theorists, while accounting for other sources of endogeneity in corporate finance research. Therefore, to check whether our OLS regression estimates are robust, we have also undertaken the analysis using dynamic panel estimation. Results of our dynamic panel estimation are reported in Table 12 .
Conclusion
This study investigates the nature of the relationship between ownership, identity and financial performance of publicly listed companies in New Zealand and whether the relationship between ownership-performance changes during the financial crisis. In this regard, we address three noble questions in our study: (i) Does ownership concentration have an effect on the financial performance of the publicly listed companies? (ii) Do different owner identities have different effects on the financial performance of publicly listed companies? (iii) Does the relationship between ownership-performance changes during the financial crisis period? In regard to the question addressed, we report our findings as follows:
1. Our findings support the view that ownership concentration affects performance.
However, our results for New Zealand are quite different to that reported for Turkey (Gursoy and Aydogan, 2002) and China (Xu and Wang, 1999) . Results
show that a higher ownership concentration in listed companies in New Zealand leads to a lower market-based performance (Tobin's Q) and higher accounting-based performance (ROA).
A plausible reason could be that higher ownership concentration has more formal authority and therefore, blockholding gives enough power to obtain some active roles in the company. The power blockholders' have in these companies tends to be very high and therefore, their opinions tends to matter in regard to the managerial decision-making. Our results show that blockholders have tended to pay more attention to accounting-based performance rather than market-based performance. This is not surprising as the capital market activities were affected globally, investors barely made any decent gains from share price appreciation. Therefore, investors during the financial crisis have relied on profits from the operational activities to boost their earning by the way of getting higher dividends payouts.
2. We report that the owner identity do have an effect on the financial performance of publicly listed companies in New Zealand. More "detached" level owners (institutional investors) have a positive effect on market-based performance but negative effect on accounting-based performance. Whereas, more "involved" level owners (corporate investors) have a negative effect on market-based performance.
Our findings support the view that institutional ownership increases Tobin's Q and decreases ROA, whereas corporate holding decreases Tobin's Q. This result indicate that the "detached" owners have positive effects on market performance but negative effect on accounting performance whereas, "involved" level owners have negative effects on market performance. This finding indicates that the "detached" level owners have less power in seeking the short-run profit and therefore, focus less interest on operational matters but more on long-term growth of the company.
3. The relationship between owner identity and financial performance changes during economic shocks, such as, the financial crisis. The results show that less "involved" holding leads to higher performance in New Zealand market. During financial crisis, the evidence shows that the effects of owner identity declines due to the fact that different types of owners have reduced their ownership concentration levels, thus reducing their social influence and expertise powers.
Our results show that the largest shareholder held 34.49% of the shares and five largest shareholders held in excess of 50% (on an average basis) of the shares. This indicates that that top five shareholders have absolute control of the publicly listed companies in New Zealand. Our results also show that the average proportion of corporate and employee holding in New Zealand is much higher compared to that in P a g e | 25
Australia, the UK and the US; thus confirming that the "involvement" ownership type (corporate holding) is more popular in New Zealand context.
Our results show that there are two different kinds of foreign investor existing in New
Zealand market, that is, one seeking long-run returns and low risk and other seeking more risky investments opportunities.
Finally, we caution readers regarding generalizing the findings of this study as the sample size used is small and the study focuses specifically on New Zealand environment. However, the issues raised could be adopted for future studies. Q is the proportion of ((stock price * No. of share outstanding) + L/T debt + S/T debt) to Total Assets. ROA is the proportion of Net Income to Total Assets. TIME is the dummy variable equal to "1" if the year is 2007, otherwise "0". SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. LEV is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. FMRISK is the standard deviation of the firm's daily stock returns. IH1 is the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl index. LT5 is the natural logarithm of the proportion of shares held by top5 five shareholders. Table 10 Q is the proportion of ((stock price * No. of share outstanding) + L/T debt + S/T debt) to Total Assets. ROA is the proportion of Net Income to Total Assets. TIME is the dummy variable equal to "1" if the year is 2007, otherwise "0". SIZE is the natural logarithm of the total assets. LEV is the ratio of long term debt to total assets. FMRISK is the standard deviation of the firm's daily stock returns. IH1 is the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl index. LT5 is the natural logarithm of the proportion of shares held by top5 five shareholders. 
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